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THE EVOLUTION OF "SUBSTANTIAL
CONTINUITY OF IDENTITY
IN THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE" SINCE
JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. v. LIVINGSTON
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is the method employed in almost every industry
for the resolution of deadlocks in the adjustment of grievances
under collective bargaining agreements.1 The duty to arbitrate
is the contractual obligation to submit a disputed matter to some
selected person or persons for resolution, thus avoiding the alter-
native delay and expense of ordinary litigation.2 Indeed, arbi-
tration serves as "the substitute for industrial strife [and is the]
part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself."
3
Since arbitration is a consensual agreement, a party cannot be
required to arbitrate any dispute over subject matter which is
not arbitrable under the collective agreement. Moreover, the
authority of the arbitrator is governed by the collective bargain-
ing agreement itself.4 In section 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act,5 Congress gave the courts the duty of ascertain-
ing whether a particular dispute is one covered by the contract.6
Further, the court may determine whether a party who refuses
to arbitrate has breached this agreement.
1. Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law i Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L.
Rz . 999, 1007 (1955).
2. Wauregan Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union, 21 Conn. Supp. 134,
146 A.2d 592, 595 (1958).
3. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960).
4. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
5. 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). Sec. 301(a) provides:
Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting com-
merce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organiza-
tions, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
6. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241 (1962); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
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The Supreme Court in John Wiley c Sons, Inc. v. Living-
ston held that a successor-employer who was not a party to his
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement is bound to arbi-
trate under that contract if there is substantial similarity of
operation and continuity of identity of the predecessor's business
enterprise after a change in ownership. Wiley established no
definitive criteria for determining whether substantial con-
tinuity exists after a change in ownership and business struc-
ture, but left the development to subsequent case law.
This paper will explore the significant post-Wiley decisions
in attempting to draw some definite conclusions as to when a
successor-employer must arbitrate grievances under a precedes-
sor's collective bargaining agreement. Consideration will be
given to the nature of the transfers-mergers, sales of assets,
and transfers in bankruptcy-and the various other factors, such
as location and nature of business activity of the successor, used
by the courts to determine whether or not "substantial con-
tinuity of identity" exists so that a successor must arbitrate
grievances.
II. TE JoHN Wnmy & SoNs DEcISION
On October 2, 1961, Interscience Publishers, Inc. merged with
John Wiley & Sons, a much larger New York City publishing
firm. Prior to the merger, Interscience had entered into a col-
lective bargaining agreement which was to expire January 31,
1962. It contained no express provision making it binding upon
successors of Interscience.8 One week before the expiration of
the Interscience collective bargaining agreement, the Union
commenced an action to compel arbitration.9
At the time of the merger, Interscience operated a single plant
in New York City with a gross annual income in excess of one
million dollars, and employed about eighty persons, of whom
forty were union members. By contrast, Wiley's total volume
exceeded nine million dollars and it employed some three hun-
dred employes, none of whom were represented by the Union.10
7. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). For an exhaustive study of the John Wiley & Sons
decision see Patrick, Implications of the John Wiley Case for Business Trans-
fers, Collective Agreements, and Arbitration, 18 S.C.L. REY. 413 (1966).
8. 376 U.S. at 544-45.
9. Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
10. 376 U.S. at 545.
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The Union, relying on § 90 of the New York Stock Corpora-
tion Law which provides that no "claim or demand for any
cause)) against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished
by a consolidation," took the position that after the merger
Wiley was obligated to recognize certain rights of the Inter-
science employees which had "vested." These rights concerned
matters generally covered by collective bargaining agreements
such as seniority, severance pay, and pension fund payments.' 2
Wiley asserted that the merger terminated the bargaining
agreement for all purposes, and thus refused to recognize the
Union as the bargaining agent of Interscience employees. The
company further contended that since it was never a party to the
collective bargaining agreement it was not bound by the con-
tract, and that the Union lost its status as representative of the
former Interscience employees when they were mingled in a
larger Wiley unit of workers.' 3
Wiley, therefore, posed the question of whether or not a com-
pany which did not itself sign the collective bargaining agree-
ment on which the Union's claim to arbitration was based, was
bound by its predecessor's arbitration provisions. The Supreme
Court in a unanimous decision held that the disappearance of
a corporate employer through a merger does not automatically
terminate all rights of employees under a collective bargaining
agreement, and that in appropriate circumstances the successor
may be required to arbitrate with the Union.' 4 The Court recog-
nized that if a "change in the corporate structure or ownership
of a business enterprise had the automatic consequence of remov-
ing a duty to arbitrate" 5 federal policy of settling disputes by
arbitration would be thwarted. Nevertheless, a strict reading of
the decision might limit its holding to a "merger" situation. As
one court has indicated, the guarded language of Wiley makes
11. N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 90 (McKinney 1954) provides in part:
The rights of creditors of any constituent corporation shall not in
any manner be impaired, nor shall any liability or obligation due or
to become due, or any claim or demand for any cause existing
against any such corporation or against any stockholder thereof
be released or impaired by such consolidation; but such consoli-
dated corporation shall be deemed to have assumed and shall be
liable for all liabilities and obligations of each of the corporations
consolidated in the same manner as if such consolidated corporation
had itself incurred such liabilities . . ..
12. 376 U.S. at 552.
13. Id. at 545.
14. Id. at 548.
15. Id. at 549.
[Vol. 21
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it "unreasonable or inequitable to require labor or management
to adhere to particular terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment previously negotiated"'16 in every instance.
With this background, it is possible to begin an examination
of the factors utilized to determine substantial continuity of the
business enterprise under the Wiey decision, and the types of
transfers to which they apply.
III. Tree oF ConroATE TRNssrRs
A. Merger
Merger involves the transfer of property by one or more cor-
porations to another corporation. The transferor corporations
are swallowed up or "merged" into one corporation which re-
mains in existence."" Quite naturally, since Wiley involved a
merger, there has been much less significant case development
in this area than in the other types of corporate transfers.
One decision, Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Bath Marine Drafts-
men's Ass'n,'8 reveals an interesting application of the Wiley
principles to a merger. Bath involved a merger of a wholly
owned subsidiary, Hyde Windlass Company, with its parent.
Both companies had similar agreements with the same union
except for a few provisions in certain areas. The issue in the
case was not whether arbitration was applicable, but which
company's contract-Bath's or Hyde's-was to serve as the basis
of arbitration.
Since the contract of the successor, Bath Iron Works, was
more advantageous to the Hyde employees, the Union had the
precarious position of arguing that the Hyde contract ought not
survive under the Wiley doctrine. In holding that the successor's
contract was to govern, the lower court readily distinguished
Wiley. It pointed out that since both predecessor and successor
were represented by the same union there was no danger of
thwarting national labor policy favoring arbitration.
The court of appeals examined the pre- and post-merger em-
ployment situation with the purpose of balancing the equities
16. United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 895 (3d
Cir. 1964).
17. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 98 F.2d 807, 810-11 (3d Cir.
1938); Von Weise v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 1934);
Fidanque v. American Maracaibo Co., 33 Del. Cb. 262, 92 A.2d 311, 315
(1952).
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of the two contracts. Upon consummation of the merger, the
Hyde employees became part of a much larger company and
their "work universe" had changed significantly. The Hyde
contract furnished no effective vehicle for arbitration. Any
changes in the Hyde contract designed to place the Hyde em-
ployees on an equal footing with Bath employees would in
essence amount to a cancellation of the existing Hyde contract
with its arbitration provision. The Bath contract thus provided
the basis for the arbitration.
B. Sale of Assets
There are statements in the Wiley opinion which, if consid-
ered separately, might indicate that if a change of employees is
accomplished by a sale and purchase of assets instead of by
merger, the successor might not be bound to arbitrate under his
predecessor's collective bargaining contract. Subsequent deci-
sions have demonstrated, however, that the case was not limited
to mergers. It was decided upon a broader ground dictated by
the policy of the national labor laws.19
Before discussing those "sale of assets" decisions adhering the
Wiley doctrine, it should be pointed out that not all courts have
held that the successor-employer is bound to arbitrate under the
seller's collective bargaining agreement following the sale or
purchase of assets. For example, a successor-employer is under
no duty to arbitrate under a predecessor's pre-sale collective
bargaining agreement when the National Labor Relations Board
has declared another union to be the bargaining representative
for all of the successor-corporation's employees. 20 Also, where
the successor purchases only one of many stores or plants owned
by the seller, one decision recognizes that the successor-employer
is under no duty to arbitrate. 21 Since the seller's business still
operates, the employees would apparently have easy redress
against their former employer for arbitration of their griev-
ances.22
19. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F2d 891
(3d Cir. 1964); Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d
954 (9th Cir. 1964); International Bhd. of Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill
Workers v. Great Northwest Fibre Co., 263 F. Supp. 167 (E.D. Wash. 1965).
20. McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 355 F.2d 352 (2d Cir. 1966).
21. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 954 v. Lane's of Findlay, Inc., 260
F. Supp. 655 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
22. Comment, 29 U. PiTT. L. REv. 273, 277 (1967).
[Vol. 21
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The first significant decision applying the rationale of Wiley
in requiring arbitration following the sale or purchase of assets
was Vackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers.23 Wack-
enhut purchased the business and assets of General Plant Pro-
tection Company, but did not expressly assume the obligations
of General Plant's labor agreement encompassing certain wage
increases, a union shop and checkoff provision.
Three theories were advanced by the Union upon which Wack-
enhut would have been bound by the predecessor's collective
bargaining agreement. First, it was suggested that the company
had expressly agreed to be bound by the labor agreement. See-
ond, the Union suggested that Wackenhut was estopped from
denying that it was bound because of its course of conduct.
Third, the Union contended that Wackenhut as a successor-
employer was bound by the labor agreement of its predecessor
under the rationale of John Wiley & Son, Inc. v. Livingston.
The lower court found that Wackenhut was bound to arbitrate
under the predecessor's contract upon the first theory listed
above. The court of appeals, however, rejected this finding, and
instead held for the Union on the basis of the third theory;
namely, that where there is substantial continuity of identity
and operation of the business before and after a change in own-
ership, regardless of the form of the change,24 a collective
bargaining agreement is binding upon the successor-employer.
Several additional cases in this area are significant in demon-
strating strict compliance with the Wiley decision. For instance,
where a company is forced to sell its plant because of financial
difficulties under a contract of sale requiring the seller to shut
down its plant and mail employees a notice of final termination
of their employment prior to the closing date of the sale, Wiley
is applicable.25 This is true despite an express provision in the
contract of sale stating that the buyer assumes none of the
seller's employment contracts, union contracts, or other labor
agreements.
23. 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964).
24. Cf. United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 895
n.3 (3d Cir. 1964). In Relianwe the court recognized that Wackenhut viewed
the Wiley decision as authority for making a pre-existing labor contract
unequalifiedly binding upon a new proprietor, assuming of course, that there
was substantial continuity of identity.
25. International Bhd. of Pulp, Sulphite, & Paper Mill Workers v. Great
Northwest Fibre Co., 263 F. Supp. 167 (E.D. Wash. 1965); cf. K.B. & J.
Young's Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1967).
1969]
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss3/8
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REViEW
Purchase of a plant under an ordered divestiture by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission will not relieve the successor company
of an obligation to arbitrate issues covered by and arbitrable
under a predecessor's labor contract. 20 Here the ruling court
found little significance in the fact that the contract of sale
contained a provision expressly relieving the buyer of any obli-
gations under the collective bargaining agreement. This court
admitted that there might be some circumstances in which it
would be unreasonable to require an adherence to particular
terms of a collective bargaining agreement previously negotiated
by a predecessor. 27 Since this plant was sold as a going concern
and since the original operation was to remain intact, the sale
fell within the Viley doctrine. Unfortunately, no specific guide-
lines were mentioned as to just when it might be unreasonable
to require the successor to arbitrate.
Apparently the successor-employer is not relieved of his duty
to arbitrate under the collective bargaining agreement of the
predecessor-seller, even though the seller's collective bargaining
contract expires prior to the take-over.28 In Overnite Transpor-
tation Co. v. NLRB29 certain operating franchises and
physical assets of Rutherford Freight Lines, Inc. were pur-
chased by Overnite. Overnite, acting unilaterally, immediately
put into effect its own wage scale which was lower than that
existing at Rutherford. Relying in part on the Wiey decision,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recognized that the
National Labor Relations Board could direct Overnite to restore
to the former Rutherford employees the economic benefits that
had been maintained by the seller and incorporated in its con-
tract with the Union, despite the contract's having expired
before the sale. Under the rationale of this decision one can
logically argue that a successor would be bound to arbitrate
grievances that were pending under a contract which expired
prior to the take-over by the successor-employer.
With only minor exceptions, the decisions demonstrate that
the Wiley decision is not limited to mergers. Having been
decided upon broad national labor policy, Wiley has been ex-
tended to the sale and purchase of the assets of a business as
26. United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir.
1964).
27. Id. at 895.
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a going concern. This has been true despite the expiration of the
predecessor's contract prior to the consummation of the purchase
if the grievances have been pending.
C. Transfer by a Trustee in Bankruptcy
As previously discussed, mere sale of assets because of a com-
pany's financial difficulties will not relieve a successor of an
obligation to arbitrate under the seller's collective bargaining
agreement.30 One court has held, however, that where the sale
is by a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy and the receiver has
discontinued business operations before the sale, the successor
is not obligated to arbitrate under the bankrupt's collective
bargaining agreement.3 '
In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. District 65, Retail, Wholesale &
Department Store Union, -3 2 Owens-Illinois purchased all the
machinery and equipment, and all inventories of raw materials
and work in process of Atlantic Container Corporation through
a receiver in bankruptcy. The order of the referee in bank-
ruptcy provided that the sale of the assets of Atlantic would be
"free and clear of any and all rights, claims, liens, [and] encum-
brances"3 3 and there was no reference to Atlantic's collective
bargaining agreement with the defendant in the agreement of
sale.
The court found that there was no substantial continuity of
identity here for several reasons. The Atlantic plant became
integrated into the Owens-Illinois operations of manufacturing
corrugated boxes, and only a small number of the production
employees formerly worked for Atlantic. Certainly, the re-
ceiver's actions in terminating business operations prior to the
sale interrupted the continuity of Atlantic. In addition, the
Union at the successor employer's Newark, New Jersey plant
had agreed to represent those employees at the old Atlantic
plant.
Wrhether the receiver's actions in terminating the business
operations were important in the court's finding of lack of sub-
stantial continuity is difficult to determine from the opinion
30. See note 25 supra.
31. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. District 65, Retail, Wholesale & Department Store
Union, 276 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 393 F.2d 932 (2d
Cir. 1968).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 741.
1969]
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itself; particularly in light of the fact that the Union at the
successor's plant agreed to represent the employees at the At-
lantic plant. If a receiver continues to operate the plant as a
going concern and then sells it, however, several authorities
suggest that the successor will be bound to arbitrate under the
predecessor's contract.
34
IV. FACTORS UTILIZED TO DETERINE "SUBSTANTIAL CONTINUITY
OF THE BusNEss ENTERPRISE."
A. Location of the Successor Enterp7ise
A study of the Wiley merger reveals a mere absorption by
Wiley of Interscience Publishers. This change was accomplished
when Interscience offered its employees in its only plant, jobs at
the Wiley plant.3 5 One court of appeal's decision found signifi-
cance in the fact that an Interscience employee might have
secured a job at Wiley merely by reporting for duty at the
Wiley plant located in the same city the next day after the
Interscience operations ceased." Under the reasoning of Piano
&r Musical Instrument lVorkers, Lqcal 2549 v. W.W. Kimball
0o.,37 a successor-employer, where there is a substantial differ-
ence in the location of his plant and his predecessor's, would
apparently not be bound by the predecessor's contract because
substantial continuity of the business enterprise would be lack-
ing. For a worker to accept a position at a successor's plant
located at a distant site, he would have to uproot his family and
move to the new locale. In addition to a time loss for both the
employer and the employee, only a limited number of workers
would likely choose to make such a transition.
Kimball was reversed, however, by the Supreme Court ;38 and
on remand the district court ordered arbitration of grievances. 39
34. Cf. Johnson v. England, 356 F.2d 44, 49 (9th Cir. 1966) and NLRB v.
Coal Creek Coal Co., 204 F.2d 579, 580 (10th Cir. 1953). In Coal Creek it
was suggested that if a company continues to operate through a receiver it
is responsible for unfair labor practices and such responsibility cannot be
avoided by reorganizations and transfers. See also Comment, 29 U. PIr. L.
Rav. 273, 280 (1967).
35. See Piano & Musical Instrument Workers Union, Local 2549 v. W.W.
Kimball Co., 333 F.2d 761 (7th Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 379 U.S. 357 (1964).
While this case did not involve a successor-employer but a relocation of the
employer's business, it is sufficiently analogous to the Wiley decision for
purposes of determining substantial continuity of identity.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 379 U.S. 357 (1964).
39. Piano & Musical Instrument Workers Union, Local 2549 v. W.W.
Kimball Co., 239 F. Supp. 523 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
[Vol. 21
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From this, the conclusion is reached that location of the suc-
cessor's business enterprise is not enough alone to constitute lack
of substantial identity even though the two plants may be in
different states. This is not to say, however, that the location
of the successor's business may not be a factor in determining
substantial continuity of the business enterprise.
In Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston,4" Sander relocated
its plant in Newark, New Jersey when its New York City plant
became outmoded. The Second Circuit affirmed the district
court decision in finding that there was substantial continuity
of identity between the operations at the two plants. Among the
factors considered by the circuit court was the fact that both
plants were located in the New York metropolitan area.41 While
location itself may not establish lack of substantial identity, if
the location is coupled with other factors, it may contribute to
a finding of lack of substantial identity.
At the same time, the fact that the successor's business is
located at the same site as his predecessor's will not alone mean
that there is substantial continuity of identity in the business
enterprise.4
2
B. Physical Features and Nature of Aetivities of the New
Enterprise
A graphic illustration of what is meant by physical features
and nature of activities of the new enterprise is that presented
in Local Joint Executive Board, Hotel & Restaurant Employees
& Bartenders International Union v. Joden, Ine.43 Joden entered
into an agreement with the representatives of Prince Spaghetti
House, Inc. for the purchase of a restaurant. Prince continued
operating the restaurant as the "Prince Spaghetti House" until
the close of business, March 31, 1965. When the restaurant
opened the next morning under Jo den's ownership and manage-
ment there had been no change in its physical appearance, its
name, and its service to its patrons. Not only was the nature of
the two businesses identical, but no evidence of any change in
ownership was immediately given to the public. Joden waited
40. 377 F2d 6 (2d Cir. 1967).
41. Id. at 12.
42. See, e.g., Retail Store Employees Union, Local 954 v. Lane's of Findlay,
Inc., 260 F. Supp. 655 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
43. 262 F. Supp. 390 (D. Mass. 1966).
1969] NoTs
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ten days after taking over to change the name to "Vince
Spaghetti House." Even after the name was changed to "Vince"
the old Prince menu jackets were still being used. The name
"Prince" remained embedded in the pavement at the main door
of the establishment. Relying on the similarity of these physical
features, as well as on the nature of the business activity, the
court held that there was substantial continuity of identity in
the restaurant enterprise before and after it was sold by Prince
to Joden.
Another example of similarity in physical feature and nature
of business activities of the successor is that furnished by Wack-
enhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers.4 4 Wackenhut,
under a contract of sale, assumed substantially all of the mone-
tary liabilities of General Plant Protection Co. It acquired Gen-
eral Plant's leaseholds in various properties, all of its contracts
with customers and all customer lists. Wackenhut used the same
office facilities and equipment. In addition, the predecessor's
name remained on the door.
In contrast, where a chain store with several outlets in an area
terminated its business at a particular location by selling certain
of its furnishings, equipment, trade fixtures and merchandise
to another chain store, substantial continuity was found lacking
despite the fact that the chain stores were engaged in the same
type business.4 Here changes were made in the physical interior
of the store and several weeks elapsed before the successor was
able to operate fully at the new location.
Where the basic operation is identical, the inventory pur-
chased is substantial, and little change is made in overall opera-
tion and appearance of the enterprise, substantial continuity is
deemed to exist. As a general rule the courts have regarded
minor changes to be insignificant in the determination of sub-
stantial continuity of identity.
(0. Continuity of Employment
In an attempt to obviate the necessity of arbitrating under a
predecessor's collective bargaining contract, the successor often
reduces the number of workers previously employed by a pre-
decessor or attempts to terminate the employment of all the
44. 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964).
45. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 954 v. Lane's of Findlay, Inc., 260
F. Supp. 655 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
[Vol. 21l
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workers for a period of time before rehiring some or all of
them. Thus, continuity of employment in this context refers to
the number of workers employed by a successor who were pre-
viously employed by the seller, and to the length of time between
the termination of the predecessor's operations and the com-
mencement of the successor's business enterprise.
The decisions dealing with the number of employees retained
by the successor involve complete retention,46 almost complete
retention 47 and substantial rehiring.48 In one decision the pre-
decessor's employees were given preferential hiring status which
indicated similarity in the two plants. 4 9 In another decision,
despite the discharge of all employees by the seller at the direc-
tion of the successor, it was found that substantial continuity of
identity existed and that the old employees had been wrongfully
discharged and were entitled to reinstatement.5 0
Length of time between the sale and the beginning of working
operations apparently is a factor to be considered. In Retail
Store Employees Union v. Lane's of Findley, Ine.5 1 the court
pointed out that full operations at the store did not begin for
approximately three weeks after the sale and after a substantial
amount of remodeling. Here, none of the employees of the seller
who were represented by the Union had been hired by Lane's.
While there was lack of substantial continuity in this case, the
element of time was a minor factor in the court's determination.
In addition, when there is not a break in the operations of the
enterprises, the courts tend to find substantial continuity.5 2
Thus, where there are at least a substantial number of em-
ployees retained by the successor, the courts uphold the con-
tinuity of identity and the duty to arbitrate. Additionally, the
46. United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir.
1964); Wackenhut Corporation v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954
(9th Cir. 1964).
47. United States Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 38 (5th Cir.
1967) (all except three former employees).
48. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union v. Joden, Inc.,
262 F. Supp. 390 (D. Mass. 1966) (where 12 out of 30 employees remained).
49. Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston, 262 F. Supp. 129, 136 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), aff'd, 377 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1967).
50. I-B. & J. Young's Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 463 (9th Cir.
1967).
51. 260 F. Supp. 655 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
52. E.g., Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1967);
United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964);
Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir.
1964) ; Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union v. Joden,
Inc., 262 F. Supp. 390 (D. Mass. 1966).
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length of time between the sale and the successor's beginning
operations is perhaps a minor factor considered by the courts.
D. Representative Union at the Successor's Plant
The Supreme Court pointed out in the Wiley decision that
none of John Wiley's employees were represented by a union.r3
In McGuire v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.54 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit had to decide whether a successor-
employer was obligated to arbitrate grievances of the prede-
cessor-employer when the successor's employees were represented
by a union which such arbitration might undermine. The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board had previously ruled that the
employees of Weber & Quinn, the seller, were effectively
merged into Humble's union. The court, however, found that
Humble was not required to arbitrate under Weber & Quinn's
collective bargaining agreement. To compel arbitration would
lead to an obvious conflict between the interests of the Humble
employees as a whole and the small number of the employees
formerly employed by the seller. Where such a conflict is likely,
the duty to arbitrate does not arise.
V. CONCLUSION
The Wiley decision has had a profound effect upon the field
of labor relations law as evidenced by the many decisions that
have interpreted, distinguished, and extended its doctrine. The
duty of a successor to arbitrate under a predecessor's collective
bargaining agreement includes not only mergers but also the sale
and purchase of assets of a corporation. In determining whether
or not a successor must arbitrate the courts look at the location
of the successor enterprise, the nature of the business activities
performed at the successor's plant, and the continuity of employ-
ment. Where there is a union at the new employer's business,
the court should also consider whether or not arbitration would
undermine the existing union at the successor's plant. Finally,
since arbitration is the part and parcel of the collective bargain-
ing process, most courts have recognized that insignificant
changes in the business enterprise should not defeat the duty to
arbitrate under the predecessor's contract.
R. DAvis HowsER, III
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